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Abstract
We investigate decision-making behaviour in all four non-human great ape species. Apes chose between a safe and a risky
option across trials of varying expected values. All species chose the safe option more often with decreasing probability of
success. While all species were risk-seeking, orangutans and chimpanzees chose the risky option more often than gorillas
and bonobos. Hence all four species’ preferences were ordered in a manner consistent with normative dictates of expected
value, but varied predictably in their willingness to take risks.
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Introduction
Everyday, we face situations requiring us to decide between
options for which we weigh how much we might get out of it and
how likely we are to get it if we tried. Any agent, in order to
successfully navigate a world of possibilities, needs to strike the
right balance between these factors, utilizing mechanisms that
when confronted with risky choices, lead to decisions, which
optimally combine the probability of receiving a reward multiplied
by the amount of the reward (expected value: EV). Additionally to
the ability to make weighed choices in risky situations, individuals
might have certain preferences when negotiating risk, even if all
available options have identical expected values. For example, in
scenarios with stable expected values, but varying levels of risk
humans tend to choose the safe over the risky option. When for
example asked to chose between a box containing 10 Euros for
certain or another box with a 50/50 chance of containing 20
Euros or being empty, human subjects prefer the safe option [1].
Non-human animals largely appear to share the human
preference to avoid risk. A comparison of risk sensitivity across a
large number of species found most to be either risk averse or risk
neutral. Risk seeking species appear to be rare [2]. Given this
background, comparisons across the primate family have docu-
mented a surprising amount of variation both between [2] and
within species depending on the task [3]. While some species, for
example bonobos, appear risk averse, other species, for example
chimpanzees prefer risky over safe options [4]. There have been a
number of recent attempts to elucidate the socio-ecological
determinants of such inter-specific variability using the compar-
ative method [5,6]. Thus, feeding ecology has been associated
both with risk preference in chimpanzees and bonobos [4] and
delay of gratification in callitrichids [7]. Similarly, socio-ecological
factors have also been linked with certain cognitive abilities. For
example, fission-fusion dynamics have been associated with
inhibitory control in primates [8] and social complexity has been
linked to transitive inference and behavioral flexibility in corvids
[9]. Here we investigate decision-making in four members of the
great ape family: Orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla),
bonobos (Pan paniscus), and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Our aim is
to extend what is known from prior research in three ways. First,
we test whether non-human great apes choose based on expected
value in a risky scenario (optimally combining probability of
success and the value of the reward) by varying both the
probability of success and the relative value of the risky vs. the
safe choice. Second, we test whether non-human great apes
consider their own level of uncertainty when choosing options in a
risky scenario by varying the amount of relevant information
available to the individual. Third, we aim to validate prior results
documenting differences in risk-preferences between chimpanzees
and bonobos [4] with a different task and extend the number of
great ape species in order to evaluate different explanations for the
interspecific variation in risk preference.
Methods
Subjects
We tested eight chimpanzees, five bonobos, six orangutans, and
three gorillas between the age of 4 and 35 years (see Table S1).
There were eight males and 14 females. All apes were born in
captivity and were housed in social groups at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler
Primate Research Center (WKPRC) in Zoo Leipzig (Germany).
The apes were housed in semi-natural indoor and outdoor
enclosures with a minimum size of 2000 m2 per species, regular
feeding schedules, enrichment, and water ad lib. Rewards were
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highly valued food-items. Prior to this study all apes had
participated in various studies on social and physical cognition.
Apes were neither food nor water deprived during testing or at any
other time.
Apparatus
Five small brown bowls forming a straight line were placed on a
table that could be slid forward within the subject’s reach.
Additional materials included: a large hexagonal yellow cup (cup
1), 4 smaller identical square blue cups (cups 2–5), and a barrier to
block visual access to the blue cups. On top of the visual occluder
two additional brown bowls were placed left and right of the
midline (see Figure 1).
Procedure
All procedures were non-invasive and subjects could choose to
stop participating at any time. Animal husbandry and research
complied with the ‘‘EAZA Minimum Standards for the Accom-
modation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria’’, the ‘‘EEP
Bonobo Husbandry Manual’’ for the Bonobo group in particular,
the ‘‘EAZA Code of Practice Article 4: Research’’ and the
‘‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on
Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’’.
On every trial subjects faced a table with five small, empty bowls
placed in a row. The experimenter then placed two pieces of
banana, one large one small, standing upright on the table. After
approximately 2 seconds, the small piece was always placed in the
bowl to the far right of the subject providing a spatially stable safe
option. The large piece was placed in any of the remaining four
brown bowls (risky option). Depending on the intended level of
uncertainty (see below) subjects were able to witness (or not) the
food’s final destination. The small piece was always hidden under
a yellow cover providing a stable colour cue identifying the safe
option additionally to the stable spatial location. The large piece
was always hidden under a blue cover.
Choosing based on EV: In order to test subjects’ abilities to
choose based on EV, we varied both the probability of success and
the relative value of the risky option. Placing an additional number
of blue cups over some or all of the remaining empty brown bowls
varied the probability of success. As a result a random choice
amongst blue cups would result in the following probabilities (P): 1
blue cup: P = 1; 2 blue cups: P = .5; 3 blue cups: P= .33; 4 blue
cups: P= .25. Decreasing the size of the small piece of banana
varied the relative value (V) of the large piece (always 3 cm in size)
over the small piece in three steps: small piece = 0.5 cm: V= 6;
small piece = 1.0 cm: V= 3; small piece = 2.0 cm: V=1.5. Table 1
specifies the expected values (EV=P6V) across different relative
values (V) and probabilities of success (P). If non-human great apes
decide based on EV in risky situations, considering both, relative
value and probability of success, they should chose the risky option
more often in scenarios with higher EV than in scenarios with a
low EV.
In order to test whether non-human great apes consider their
own level of uncertainty we hid the risky option either in full view
of the subject (visible condition) or hidden behind an occluder
(hidden condition). In the visible condition, subjects witnessed
under which blue cup the large piece was hidden. Therefore, in all
visible trials, the probability to find the large piece, if the subjects
could remember the location correctly, was P= 1. In hidden trials,
the probability of success varied between .25 and 1 from trial to
trial (see Table 1). If non-human great apes considered their own
level of uncertainty when making choices in risky situations, they
should choose the risky option more often on visible than hidden
trials. This prediction is based on data from previous studies
showing that apes select the riskier option more often in visible
than hidden trials [10–12]. Once all cups were placed (and the
occluder was removed on the hidden trials) the ape could choose
one of the available options by touching one of the cups. In
response the experimenter handed subjects whatever was under
the cup they had indicated. In the case the cup was empty, the
experimenter opened all cups and removed the remaining food.
We administered six 16-trial sessions. Two consecutive sessions
used one particular size piece of banana as the safe option. The
order in which the different size safe options were administered
Figure 1. Experimental setup faced by the subjects. Depicted are
the safe cup (yellow) the risky cups (blue) and bowls (brown) in addition
to the barrier (green) blocking visual access to the blue cups during the
baiting in hidden trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028801.g001
Table 1. Expected values across different combinations of
relative value of the large reward over the small reward (V)
and probabilities of success (P).
(V)
(P) 1.5 3 6
.25 .375 .75 1.5
.33 .5 1 2
.5 .75 1.5 3
1 1.5 3 6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028801.t001
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was counterbalanced across subjects. Within each session,
probability of success (.25, .33, .5, 1), the order in which safe
and risky options were hidden (safe first, risky first) and the
uncertainty of the subjects (visible, hidden) were pseudo-random-
ized across trials.
Prior to presenting a new safe option size, we administered a
pre-test to assess whether subjects could discriminate between the
larger (risky option) and the smaller (safe option) reward sizes. Both
rewards were placed standing up in the middle of the table. After
2 seconds, the two pieces were placed in the two outmost brown
bowls and covered by two blue inverted cups. The location and the
order of food placement were counterbalanced across trials. Each
subject had to choose the larger reward on 4 consecutive trials in
order to pass the pre-test.
Coding and data analysis
All sessions were videotaped and subjects’ choices were coded
live during the test. Reliability was assessed on 15% of trials
(randomly chosen) and was almost perfect (Cohen’s kappa= 0.97).
Since some of the data did not meet the normality assumption, we
used non-parametric statistics throughout. We analyzed effects of
species, visibility (hidden / visible), the relative size of the safe
reward (1/6, 1/3, 2/3) and the number of risky cups (1–4) on the
probability of choosing the risky option. We also analysed whether
EV (see Table 1) was a good predictor of subjects’ risky choices by
applying a linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and inverse function for
visible and hidden trials. We reported the function that produced
the best fit. We were particularly interested to see whether subjects
would change their choice tendencies at transition points when the
expected value is 1 (i.e., the relative size of the safe to the risky
option equals the probability of success for the risky option). We
expected subjects to choose the safe rather than the risky option
when EV,1 but select the risky rather than the safe option when
EV.1 (see Table 1). Furthermore, we tested whether the four
species would vary in their risk preferences as suggested by earlier
work on chimpanzees and bonobos [4] by comparing the
percentage of risky choices across species.
Finally, we conducted two auxiliary (control) analyses. One
analysis assessed the possibility that subjects changed their choices
with repeated testing. We did this in two ways. First, we compared
the percentage of choices directed at the risky option in the first
and second session of each of the three sizes of the safe reward
pooling visible and hidden trials. Second, we compared the first
and second half of the trials in the first session for each of the three
sizes of the safe reward. Analyzing the responses of hidden trials
only produced the same result. The second auxiliary analysis
assessed subjects’ accuracy for selecting the baited cup from the
risky alternative as a function of the size of the safe reward and the
number of cups available in the risky alternative. This analysis
allowed us to assess whether subjects had paid attention to the
location of the food in visible trials and whether they were using
inadvertent cues to locate the baited cup in hidden trials.
Results
Subjects overall chose the risky option more often in the visible
than hidden trials (Wilcoxon test: Z= 3.73, P,0.001; visible:
mean=98.1, SEM=0.6; hidden: mean= 83.7, SEM=2.2). Fur-
thermore, choosing the risky option decreased as the size of the
safe option became larger (Friedman test: x2 = 25.51, df = 2,
P,0.001, see Figure 2). Although this effect was present in both
visible (Friedman test: x2 = 19.0, df = 2, P,0.001) and hidden
trials (Friedman test: x2 = 25.72, df = 2, P,0.001), the curve was
steeper in the latter compared to the former. Subjects also chose
the risky option less often when confronted with a larger number
of cups (Friedman test: x2 = 9.24, df = 3, P= 0.026). This result,
however, could not be confirmed for hidden (Friedman test:
x2 = 5.86, df = 3, P = 0.118) or visible trials separately (Friedman
test: x2 = 3.52, df = 3, P= 0.32).
Next we analysed how accurately the EV predicted subjects’
choices in the visible and hidden trials (Figure 3). We used the EV
scores displayed in Table 1 and correlated them with the
corresponding choices of the risky option in each of the 12
possible cells. There was a significant correlation between EV and
choices both for visible (Spearman r= 0.65, P= 0.023, N= 12) and
hidden trials (Spearman r= 0.85, P,0.001, N= 12). In both cases,
inverse functions produced the best fit of the choice data (visible:
R2 = 0.37, F = 5.98, df = 10, P= 0.034, Y= 1.0012(0.021/EV);
hidden: R2= 0.71, F = 23.98, df = 10, P = 0.001, Y= 1.0012
(0.019/EV); Figure 3). Also in both cases, subjects showed a
strong tendency to select the risky option. Note that EV=1
represents the point of indifference between the safe and the risky
options and if subjects were solely choosing based on this
parameter, they should be selecting at around 50%. Clearly, this
was not the case (see Figure 3). Although the high percentage of
risky choices in visible trials is understandable since subjects knew
Figure 2. Mean % of trials in which subjects selected the risky option as a function of species and size of the safe reward for (a)
hidden and (b) visible trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028801.g002
Great Apes’ Decision Making Strategies
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e28801
where the food was located, this was not the case for hidden trials
with more than one cup.
Focusing on hidden trials (Figure 2a), species did not
significantly differ in the percentage of trials on which they chose
the risky option with the small (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2 = 1.62,
df = 3, P= 0.66) or the large size safe options (Kruskal-Wallis test:
x2 = 3.53, df = 3, P = 0.32). In contrast, there were species
differences with the medium size safe option (Kruskal-Wallis test:
x2 = 11.17, df = 3, P = 0.011). Post-hoc tests indicated that
bonobos chose the risky option significantly less often than
chimpanzees (Mann-Whitney exact test: U= 2.5, P= 0.024) and
orangutans (Mann-Whitney exact test: U=0.0, P= 0.01). More-
over, gorillas also chose the risky option less often than orangutans
(Mann-Whitney test: Z= 2.12, P = 0.034). In contrast, there were
no species differences in visible trials for any of the three sizes of
the safe option (Kruskal-Wallis tests: small: x2 = 0, df = 3, P= 1.0;
medium: x2 = 3.00, df = 3, P = 0.39; large: x2 = 6.38, df = 3,
P = 0.095).
Analysing the hidden trials in more detail within each
combination of relative value and probability of success confirmed
this result (Table 2). There were no significant differences between
species for the small size safe option, regardless of the probability
of success (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2,6.08, df = 3, P.0.10 in all
cases). Similarly, there were no significant differences between
species for the large size safe option regardless of the probability of
success (Kruskal-Wallis test: x2,5.12, df = 3, P.0.16 in all cases).
In contrast, species significantly differed in the medium size safe
option in some scenarios (Kruskal-Wallis test: 1-cup: x2 = 11.96,
df = 3, P= 0.008; 2-cup: x2 = 6.21, df = 3, P = 0.102; 3-cup:
x2 = 7.50, df = 3, P= 0.058; 4-cup: x2 = 7.86, df = 3, P= 0.049).
However, post-hoc test failed to reveal any significant inter-specific
differences (Mann-Whitney exact test: P.0.066 in all cases).
To assess potential learning effects, we compared the first and
second session for each size of the safe reward but found no change
across sessions (Wilcoxon tests: Small: z = 0.09, P= 0.93; 1st
session: mean= 97.3, SEM=1.2; 2nd session: mean=97.3,
SEM=1.3; Medium: z = 0.51, P= 0.61; 1st session: mean=95.9,
SEM=1.9; 2nd session: mean= 95.0, SEM=1.8; Large: z = 0.39,
P= 0.70; 1st session: mean= 80.1, SEM=2.6; 2nd session:
mean=79.5, SEM=2.9 ). Similarly, we found no evidence that
subjects changed their choices when comparing the first half with
the second half of the first session (Wilcoxon tests: Small: z = 1.13,
P= 0.26; 1st half: mean=98.2, SEM=1.3; 2nd half: mean=96.4,
SEM=1.5; Medium: z = 0.45, P = 0.66; 1st half: mean=96.3,
SEM=2.0; 2nd half: mean= 95.6, SEM=2.1; Large: z = 0.46,
P= 0.65; 1st half: mean=78.6, SEM=3.7; 2nd half: mean=81.6,
SEM=3.8).
Finally, there were no significant differences in the likelihood of
finding the reward from the risky cups (i.e., retrieval accuracy) as a
function of the size of the safe reward in visible (Friedman test:
x2 = 4.20, df = 2, P= 0.122) or hidden trials (Friedman test:
x2 = 1.37, df = 2, P= 0.504). Similarly, there were no differences
in retrieval accuracy as a function of the number of cups (we
excluded trials with just one cup because subjects could not be
wrong) in visible trials (Friedman test: x2 = 3.47, df = 2, P = 0.177).
In contrast, and unsurprisingly, subjects’ retrieval accuracy in the
hidden condition decreased as the number of cups available
increased (Friedman test: x2 = 17.88, df = 2, P,0.001; 2 cups:
mean=47.0, SEM=3.2; 3 cups: mean= 31.4, SEM=2.8; 4 cups:
mean=23.5, SEM=3.0).
Discussion
As predicted, subjects chose the safe option more often when
they had not witnessed the reward being placed under one of the
blue cups, indicating sensitivity for their own level of uncertainty
[10,11,13]. Additionally, safe choices increased with the size of the
safe option relative to the risky option and with a decrease in the
probability of success for the risky option. Taken together, this
means that subjects’ choices were regulated by multiple factors
including their own uncertainty, the relative value of rewards, and
the probability of success. This is even more remarkable
considering that there was no evidence that subjects learned to
produce those responses during the course of the experiment. This
is important because learned contingencies are one of the main
explanations invoked in experiments investigating decision making
in uncertain situations [14].
Our results confirmed the difference between chimpanzees and
bonobos in risk sensitivity [4] with a different method. Addition-
ally, our results showed that orangutans, just like chimpanzees,
Figure 3. Probability to select the risky option as a function of
EV for (a) hidden and (b) visible trials. Also depicted are the values
corresponding to each of the sizes of the safe reward.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028801.g003
Table 2. Median % of trials directed at the risky option as a
function of species, safe reward size, and number of risky cups
available.
safe reward size
small medium large
species 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
bonobo 100 75 100 100 100 87.5 75 50 62.5 50 37.5 50
gorilla 100 100 100 100 75 75 75 100 75 75 75 50
chimpanzee 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 75 62.5
orangutan 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 62.5 50 75
all species 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 50 75 50
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028801.t002
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were also risk-prone whereas gorillas tended to be more
conservative but not as much as bonobos. It is often assumed
that chimpanzees’ risk proneness is correlated with potentially
costly, risky strategies like coordinated hunting [15] and
particularly extensive tool use [16–18]. Compared with the
similarly risk-seeking orangutans, which do not hunt and use tools
less often [19,20] this explanation is therefore less applicable for
our results.
Heilbronner and colleagues [4] proposed that differences in the
natural ecology of the species might explain some of the
differences in risk preferences. While all ape species eat ripe fruit
when it is available, chimpanzees are ripe fruit specialists [21],
which means that in times of low fruit abundance they continue
searching for fruit. In contrast bonobos under these circumstances
switch to terrestrial herbaceous vegetation (THV), a highly
consistent food source. Their preferred food continues to be ripe
fruit, but they appear to have shifted to consuming higher levels of
leaves, young shoots, and stem tips of high quality THV than
chimpanzees [22]. The fruit consumption of lowland gorillas is
somewhat lower than that of the other apes however their intake
on THV is higher than that of chimpanzees and more similar to
that of bonobos [23].
Compared to Africa, Southeast Asia is subject to dramatic shifts
in food availability due the periodic mast fruiting of certain trees,
which affects many species including orangutans. In times of
extreme fruit scarcity (immediately following a super-abundant
mast fruiting) orangutans were observed to feed on bark [24,25].
During non-mast years with less fluctuating fruit abundance
orangutans move widely in search of ripe fruit and seeds [23]. So
orangutans present a more complicated picture. However given
that they just feed on bark in extreme environmental conditions
and in more normal circumstances will travel long ways for fruits,
one can assume that their feeding ecology is in some aspects most
similar to that of chimpanzees. These similarities might explain
why chimpanzees and orangutans appear to be more risk prone on
foraging tasks than gorillas and bonobos. Interestingly, all tested
individuals live in a zoo with highly regulated feeding schedules.
This means that differences in risk preferences based on diet would
have to rely on innate predispositions due to selection for the
natural foraging ecology of the species.
In contrast to Heilbronner and colleagues [4], we found an
overall high rate of risky choices. This is surprising because even
with a large safe option and a low probability for success, subjects
never chose the risky option less than 50% of the time in any
condition, resulting in a sub-optimal overall pattern of choices,
even though EV predicted choices with remarkable yet not perfect
accuracy. This bias towards the risky option could be explained,
for instance, by a failure to inhibit a subject’s inherent tendency to
choose the large reward. Several studies have shown that great
apes (and other primates) need a large number of trials to
overcome their initial tendency to choose a higher valued food
[26–29], even when the reward is no longer visible [29], like it was
the case in our experiment. However, alternative explanations for
the high risk taking, like an inadequate ability to infer the chances
of the risky option without experience and therefore being biased
towards a risky choice, should be taken into consideration as well.
Our high rates of risky choices are also surprising in comparison
to humans, who are known to be generally risk averse for gains
and risk seeking for losses [30]. Future studies should extend our
experimental setup to human participants, especially children, to
see how they would perform in the same task. Furthermore, great
apes’ should be tested on their risk preferences when negotiating
losses instead of gains to create another line of comparison
between humans and the other great apes. Based on our findings,
we propose that decision-making in the great apes provides a
promising context for the interpretation of decision-making in
humans, the fifth great ape species. Finally, more primate and
non-primate species need to be tested in the current and other
paradigms since the inferential strength of the comparative
analysis heavily relies on the number (and diversity) of species
entered into the analysis.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Overview of subjects. Information about name, sex
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